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The max-min linear pursuit game with quadratic performance measure IS 
examined by means of an approximation by a finite sequence of ‘open-loop’ 
max-min control stages. It is shown that under mild conditions the finite 
approximation provides a satisfactory representatron of the actual game. The 
limiting behaviour (as the number of stages approaches infinity) is also discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent paper [I] (see also [2]) the following type of fixed-duration, 
restricted end-point, max-min control problem was investigated: Consider the 
linear system with dual controls given by 
2 = A(t) x + B,(t) u + B,(t) 0, x(&l) = x0 , (1-l) 
where x = x(t) E R” is the state vector with x0 a specified initial state at time to . 
The vectors u = u(t) E R”n and z, = v(t) E R”e, regarded respectively as the 
pursuer and evader controls, are measurable and are required to satisfy 
J-, 11 ~(t)(1~ dt < co and s1 11 u(t)l12 dt < co on each compact interval IC [to, co), 
where 1) * 11 denotes the Euclidean norm. The matrices A, B, , and B, are assumed 
to have entries which are real and measurable on [to, co) with the norms 
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[I A(t) [I B,(t)11 and I/ Bs(t)]l integrable on [to, co). Associated with (1.1) is the 
pay-off functional 
(1.2) 
and termmal state x(T) = 0, where T( >t,) is a prespecified terminal time. The 
players’ control choices are made so as to optimize P, the evader being the 
maximizer and the pursuer the minimiser. 
In contrast to its one-player analogue (i.e. the fixed-duration, restricted end- 
point, quadratic optimal control problem), the problem described above is not 
completely specified unless a detailed description is given of Its “information 
structure”. Specifically, it is necessary to define in detail the degree to which each 
of the players commits himself in advance to a particular control choice, what 
information each player has about his opponent’s control choices and what 
measurements are allowed to each player (see some further discussion in [3]). 
In [ 1] the following, very elementary, information structure was assumed. We 
denote by (Pr) the resulting max-min control problem: the evader announces 
his control choice zl on [to , T] and the pursuer responds with a control function 
u such that x(T) == 0. The choice IL is made so as to minimize the pay-off P (as 
affected by the announced control V) and the choice of w is made so as to maximize 
the resulting P. It is assumed that the event (t O , x,,) is max-mm controllable at 
time T (see [l]), i.e. that against every announced evader control v,, the pursuer 
has the capabihty of enforcing x(T) = 0. 
In problem (PJ the information structure is such that the evader selects his 
control in open loop, i.e. he commits his control in advance for the whole 
duration [to, T]. This means that the evader makes no use of information that 
might become available to him during the actual execution of the game, and thus 
problem (Pi) may be regarded as unrealistic in many practical situations. At the 
other extreme is an information structure, to be denoted (P,), in which the 
evader has at each time t E (to , T] full k nowledge of the pursuer’s control U(T) 
for all 7 E [0, 1). Further, it is assumed that the evader does not announce any 
decision regarding his future behaviour but instead adopts what may be termed a 
“snap decision rule”, i.e. he decides on the value of w(t) at each t. Such informa- 
tion structures were studied by Pontryagin in [4] and by Hajek in [5] (see also 
[6] and [7]) where they investigated differential games “from the evader’s 
point of view”. The trouble with games in which snap decision rules are allowed 
is that the evader can then almost always prevent capture by employing a feed- 
back law (see below and also [I], Section IV). 
A fairly realistic situation arises when an information structure is assumed 
which is somewhere between the max-min control problem (Pr) and the snap 
decision rule (Pa). For a positive integer N we let 7 := (T - tJ/iV and divide 
the interval [to , T] into N equal subintervals Ik := [t, + (k - 1) 7, t,, + h-1, 
k =- 1) 2, .., N. U’e assume that for every state x0 E R” and every ?r = 1, 2,..., N, 
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the event (x,, , to + (k - 1) ) 7 is max-min controllable at time t, + k~, i.e. 
the pursuer can force capture on each subinterval. The players are allowed to 
choose their controls successively as follows: for each ti = 1,2,..., N, the evader, 
knowing the state x(ts + (k - 1) r) (as well as the controls u3 and w, , j z= 
1, 2,..., k - l), announces his control choice vK on Ik . The pursuer, knowing 
the announced evader control wlc as well as the evader’s K-th stage information, 
responds with control uk on Ik , while satisfying the ultimate condition that 
x(T) = 0. Again the pursuer is understood to be the minimizer and the evader 
the maximizer of P(u, v). The optimal pay-off in this problem, which we denote 
by (PN), is then given by the expression 
PN(z4*, v*) = max min max min me* max min P(u. 71). 
Ul UI % u2 “N “N (1.3) 
Information structures in which the duration of the game is subdivided into 
subintervals as above were introduced by Friedman (see [8]), and games of the 
type defined by (PN) (although with different terminal constraints) where called 
“lower T-games” by Friedman. For r = T - to (i.e. for N = 1) we have our 
original max-min control problem (PI), whereas when 7 --f 0 (i.e. when N+ CO) 
we obtain a limiting situation which formally coincide with (Pm) (although the 
limiting game may not have a solution). 
Although various practical objections can be raised against it, the information 
structure of (P,,,) is quite a reasonable approximation of a real pursuit problem. 
In the present paper we solve and investigate the pursuit problem (PM). In 
particular, we are interested in providing answers to the following questions: 
(I) How does the optimal pay-off Pr,,(~*, w*) change with N ? 
(ii) How do the optimal controls u* and D* change with N? 
(iii) What happens in the limit as N -+ CO ? 
Under our assumptions (see also the precise restatement of problem (PN) in 
Section 2 below) it turns out that the optimal pay-off PN(u*, u*) as well as the 
optimal controls U* and v”, are independent of N. Consequently, the max-min 
control strategy of problem (PI) p rovides a good approximation for a realistic 
pursuit evasion situation, and the optimal controls of problem (PJ can be used as 
a basis for choosing the controls in a pursuit game. 
The key property on which our results rest is the max-min controllability, 
which is assumed to hold on each subinterval of the sub-division of [t,, , T] 
(regardless of N). It is easily noted (see also Section 2 below) that this property 
permits the pursuer to dictate, according to his choice, the sequence of inter- 
mediate states xlc = x(ts + Kr), K = 1,2,..., N - 1 (m addition to xh- = x(T) 
= 0). As a consequence, the evader gains no actual advantage from the added 
flexibility of the subdivision. In the limit, as N + co, two cases are distinguished, 
as follows: 
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(i) Max-min controllability is totally lost, and by employing a feedback 
control, the evader can render the pursuer uncontrollable (see Section IV of Cl]). 
In this case the limiting problem has no solution or, equivalently, PJu*, w*) 
= co. 
(ii) Max-min controllability is preserved in the limit. This is the case 
in which Hajek’s snap decision rule can be employed by the evader and 
PI&*, w*> = p&4*, v*> = Pl(fL*, n*). 
The above results are valid in a quite general framework of linear systems and 
it is not difficult to perform the analysis under conditions similar to these that 
were assumed in [l]. However, in order to simplify the calculations and to avoid 
unnecessary (and unessential) technical complications, we perform the analysis 
in this paper for the time-invariant case only. Furthermore, we make a number 
of simplifying assumptions that render the calculations more transparent. The 
reader will easily convince himself of the more general validity of our conclusions. 
Throughout the paper we shall assume familiarity with the concepts and results 
of [l]. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we investigate in detail the 
problem (PN) d h an s ow that both the optimal pay-off and optimal controls are 
independent of N; in Section 3 we discuss the limiting behaviour as N- co. 
2. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM (Px) 
We shall assume that the system under consideration is time-invariant, i.e. 
that in (1 .l) the matrices A, B, and B, are constant. We further assume that 
t, = 0 so that our system equation is 
k = Ax -k B,u + B,v; x(0) = x0 . (2-l) 
We let T > 0 be the preselected terminal time, we let N be a positive integer 
and let 7 := T/N, The interval [0, T] is then subdivided so that the K-th sub- 
interval is Ik := [(k - 1) T, KT], k = 1, 2,..., N. We introduce the control- 
lability Gramians for the pursuer and evader respectively by 
and 
W, = 1’ e-AfB,B;e-A’t dt 
‘0 
(2.2) 
W, = * e-AtB,B;e-A’t dt, 
s (2.3) 0 
where the primes denote transpose. Next we make the following standing 
assumptions 
w,>o, we >o, w, - w, > 0, (2.4) 
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where the symbol > denotes positive definiteness. The positive definiteness of 
W, implies that every initial state x0 E Rn is max-min controllable in time 7 
(where in view of the time-invariance of (2.1) the assumption then holds for 
every r > 0) (see formula (2.12) in [l]). The condition W, - W, > 0 implies 
in particular (see Lemma 3.2 in [l]) that problem (PN) has a solution for each 
initial state x0, and, finally, the condition W, > 0 is assumed primarily for 
technical convenience. 
It should be emphasized that although assumption (2.4) need not be made to 
reach the basic conclusions of this paper, it does contribute significantly to the 
simplification of the algebraic manipulations. 
Next, we introduce, recursively, controllability Gramians W,,, and W,,, , 
K = 1, 2,..., N, for the pursuer and evader. (The subscripts p or e are suppressed 
in the defining formulae (2.5) and (2.6) below and W, = W,,, or W, = WE,, , 
according to whether W = W, or W = W,). We set 
w*:= w 
and for j = 1, 2,..., N - 1 we define 
WNej := W + e-A7WN--)+Ie-A’r 
whence it is readily noted that 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
and 
WN-,%, = ~‘““’ e-AtB,Bie-A’t dt. (2.8) 
(2.7) 
The defining formula (2.6) and assumptions (2.4) then imply that for all 
k = I,..., N 
Wk., > 0, Wk., > 0, w,*, - Wk., > 0. (2.9) 
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the problem (PN), we make a number 
of preliminary observations. Recall (from formulae (2.4) and (2.5) in [l]) that an 
event (x,, , t,) is max-min controllable in time t, (at,) provided that 
(2.10) 
where VD and Fe are the controllability Gramians defined on the interval 
[t, , tI] and W(.) denotes range (or image). It therefore follows from (2.9) that for 
each k (k = 1, 2,..., N) regardless of the intermediate state xk-r reached by the 
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game (PM) at the beginning of the time interval Ik, the pursuer has the capa- 
bility, against every evader’s control choice, of dictating the state xlc at the end of 
this interval. Consequently, with assumption (2.4) in force, the pursuer can 
dictate at will, and in advance, the whole sequence of intermediate states xi ,..., 
xN-i as well as the ultimate capture requirement that xN = 0. This capability 
which holds for every finite N, is the key to the results of the present paper. 
We turn now to a detailed investigation of the problem (PM). For analogy and 
detail the reader is referred to Section III of [l]. We first consider the interval 
II . Let the evader specify er on I1 . There then exists a vector yr E R” such that 
I ’ e*+t)B,w(t) dt = e*7W,yl . 0 
The pursuer, having the capability in view of (2.4), chooses the intermediate 
state xi and a control u that trasnfers the state to .ri at time 7. Hence 
x1 = f+XO + 
s 
’ eA+--t)Bpu(t) dt + eATW,y, + eA+[xO + W,w, f U’,y,] (2.11) 
0 
for an appropriate vector wi E R”. For the given w1 , which itself is of course 
determined by xi and yi , the optimal (minimizing) pursuer control on [0, T] 
is given by 
u,,(t) = Bae-A’tw,; t E [O, T]. (2.12) 
Similarly, for the specified value of yi , the optimal (maximizing) evader control 
is given by 
w&t) = B:e-A’ty,;. t E [O, T-j. (2.13) 
With the values of wr, x1 and yi temporarily specified, the interim pay-off 
on the mterval I1 is obtained as 
G = I oT [II 4t>ll* - II WI? dt = w;W,,, - y;W,y, . 
We turn now to an analysis of the game on the k-th interval I, , k = 2, 3,..., N 
At the beginning of the I,-th time interval, i.e. at time (k - 1) 7, the state is 
given by x((k - 1) T) = xlc-r . The evader chooses a control w on Ik so that for 
some yk E Rn 
eA(kT+BBw(t) dt = eA7 
I 
’ e-*“B&a + (k - 1) T) du 
0 
409/70/z-9 
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The pursuer (again having the capability in view of (2.4)) chooses the inter- 
mediate state x, and a control u that transfers the state xk-r to x, at time kr 
(note that for k = N the pursuer enforces the capture condition X, = 0). 
Thus, for some vector wk E R” we obtain the expression 
s kr xk = eArxkml + (k-h eA(k+-t)Bpu(t) dt + eA7W,y, 
(2.14) 
= eATIXk-l + wDwk f weyk]. 
Using the minimum-energy law, the optimal controls for the pursuer and evader 
(as functions of wk and yk respectively) are obtained as 
u,,[(k - 1) 7 + t] = Bae-A’tuk; t E [O, 4, (2.15) 
u,,[(k - 1) T + t] = B;e-A’tJ’k; t E [O, T]. (2.16) 
With the above control values the interim pay-off is given as 
= g1 [w:wDwl - Y:WeYJ 
(2.17) 
1) 7 + ~lll*) da 
We can now summarize the solution of problem (PN) as the solution of the 
following optimization problem: 
Problem (PN). Given x0 E Rn, solve 
N 
subject to the constraints 
5 = eATx5-l + W,w, + W,y,l; j = I,..., N, 
XN = 0. 
(2.18) 
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For convenience we now introduce the following (auxiliary) notation: 
N 
s, : = 1 [w; wp, - yjMI,y,], 
j=h 
where k = 1, 2,..., N. The constraint equations (2.18) form a backward coupling 
of the optimization variables and therefore the problem (PN) IS solved recursively 
as follows, starting with the single-stage problem 
max min(S, = w;VW,W, - yhWeyN) 
fN WN 
subject to 
0 = edATxN = xN_l + w pwN f w&Y,’ 
Under the conditions of assumption (2.4), the above is a simple quadratic 
optimization problem (see also Section III of [I]) and the optimal solution is 
obtained as: 
6 = (w, - we>-’ xN-l , 
w; = -(W 
P - we>-’ xN-~ > (2.20) 
s; = xb,(W, - WJ’ XN-_l ) (2.21) 
uZ((N - 1) 7 + t) = --BaemA’t( W, - We)-l x~__~ , t E [O, 71, (2.22) 
vz((N - 1) 7 + t) = B:emA’t(wp - we)-’ xN_l , 2 E [O, T]. (2.23) 
We now proceed inductively and assume that for the (k + 1)th stage 
s,*,, =x;(Fvk+l,, - wk+,,e)-’ xk ?
an assumption which, in view of (2.21), clearly holds for k + 1 = S. Note also 
that in view of (2.9), the matrix (W,,,., - W,,,,,) is non-singular, so that the 
expression in (2.24) makes sense for each k. The (k + 1)th stage optimization 
problem then becomes: 
max min[Sk = wiwpwk - yiweyk + xi( wk+l,D - wk+l.e)-l xk] 
Yk Ok 
subject to the constraint 
emA7x, = xk_-l + W,w, + Weyk . 
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We now define 
u k+l := k-ATWk+l.D - Wk+J e-A’T1 
and upon substitution of the constraint equation into the expression for S, , we 
obtain 
s, - w;w,w, - y;w,yk 
+ (XL1 + ww, + YiFe) VdYk-1 + WdJJ, + Wf?YJ* 
Upon expansion of the above expression and some rearrangement, we can 
rewrite our problem as the following unconstrained optimization 
s,* = yw-1 + YW,) Gc+,b1 4 W,Yk) - YW,Y, 
+ yw;wp + w,u,+,w,) wk + 2(x;-, + Y;W,) uk+,wddi. (2.25) 
In view of the positive definiteness of its component matrices, it is radily observed 
that the symmetric matrix (W, + W,U,+, W,) is positive definite (and hence 
also non-singular). The quadratic minimization part of (2.25) is therefore solved 
as 
$$4(w, + wJJk+lwD) Wk + 2(3L,, + YLWe) u7c+lwD4 
(2.26) 
= -(XL-1 + yWe) Gc+,(w;l + Qc+l)-’ Gc+l(x&l+ WCYkh 
where I.& the unique minimizing value of wk , is given by 
w/z = -(Gl + WJ’ c%-1 + WeYk). (2.27) 
Upon substitution of (2.26) into (2.25), the max-min problem reduces to the 
following quadratic maximization: 
SZ = ry[(& + YiW,) uk+&k-1 + WeYA - YiNdk 
(2.28) 
-(xi-1 + y;wej u,+,(w;’ + Qc+lrl Uk,l(%-1 + WsYdl. 
Next we simplify the right-hand side of expression (2.28) by making use of the 
following elementary identity which holds for any two nonsingular matrices U 
ana v: 
u-1 - v-1 E v-y v - U) u-1 z u-y v - ,y) y-1. (2.29) 
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In particuIar we can write 
so that (2.28) becomes 
We now introduce the notation 
and after expanding its right-hand side, (2.30) becomes 
It is easily verified that the matrix V, is symmetric and negative definite and that 
hence the quadratic maximization problem in (2.31) has the solution 
with the unique maximizing value yz given by 
y: = -w;‘v,l(v~ + Wi’) XI-1 . (2.33) 
Upon resubstitution of the defining expressions in (2.32) and repeated use of the 
identity (2.29), we finally obtain 
s,* == x;J wk,i, - WkJl xl,-1 (2.34) 
as required (see (2.24) for comparison). 
Next, in order to compute the optimal controls u* and o* for the pursuer and 
evader respectively, we need more convenient expressions for yt and ~2. 
Making use of the identity (2.29) an resubstituting the defining expression of d 
V, in (2.33) we obtain for y% the formula 
y; = (Wk,, - WJl ix-k-~ . (2.35) 
Similarly, W: is obtained from (2.27) as 
(2.36) 
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From the kth stage constraint equation we now obtain the following recursion 
formula for x2. We have for k = 1,2 ,..., N - 1 
Substitution of the above recursion in (2.35) gives 
y: = (W&, - J-&J1 d-1 
= (Wk., - WkJ1 eA’u,l(Wk_,,, - Wk-1,eY d-2 
=e _““(W,_I,, - W&J XL-2 
=e -A’7y:-‘-, , 
whence we obtain 
4/c-1)A'T * 
$7 = e y1 z ep(L-1)A'7(Wl,9 - IV,_,)-'X0 
and 
(2.37) 
WC = -r: = -e-“-l)A’T(WI,, - wI,B)-l x0 . (2.38) 
Substitution of the expression (2.38) into (2.15) now gives for k = 1, 2,..., N 
~*[(k - 1) 7 + t] = -gl~e-A’r’s-l’T+t’(~~,~ - WIJ-‘XO; t E [0, T], (2.39) 
or alternatively 
u*(t) = --B’,e-A’t(Wl,, - WJ1 X0; tE[O, T]. (2.40) 
Similarly v*(t) is obtained as 
v*(t) = B;e-A’t( WI,, - Wl,J-l x00; t E [O, T]. (2.41) 
The optimal controls obtained above in (2.40) and (2.41) are obviously 
independent of the number N of intervals into which the interval [0, T] was 
subdivided. Moreover, from (2.7) and (2.8) we see immediately that 
W,,, = IT e-AtB,B6e-A’t dt 
0 
(2.42) 
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W,,, = 1’ e-4tB,B;e-A’t dt 
0 
(2.43) 
which are the controllability Gramians evaluated on the whole interval [0, T]. 
Comparing our results with those obtained in [I], we see that the optimal con- 
trols coincide with those of the (one-stage) max-min control problem. The 
optimal pay-off is of course also the same, and upon noting that P,(u*, v*) = @ 
we have 
pi+* 9 w*) = qw,,, - wl,pso (2.44) 
just as in formula (3.25) of [l]. 
The chief conclusion of the preceding analysis is that when the max-min 
controllability condition is satisfied (as well as the properties that result from 
assumption (2.4)), the optimal solution to the one-stage max-min control 
problem is optimal also for the problem (PN), where N is an arbitrarily large 
integer. For sufficiently large N, the problem (PN) is (in its information struc- 
ture) quite a good approximation to a real pursuit game. It thus follows that the 
optimal solution to (PI), which is easily computed and evaluated, is suitable as a 
practical solution to the real pursuit game. During the actual execution of the 
game, the solution needs to be recomputed periodically to accommodate poten- 
tially changing conditions and to off-set accumulating error. 
3. THE LIMITING BEHAVIOUR 
In this section we examine the behaviour of the solution to the problem (PN) 
as N-t co. Recall from [I] that the max-min controllability condition for the 
time-invariant system (2.1) is given by 
xo E WC4 I B,lh 
=@‘([A I BeI) C WKA I BA 
(3.1) 
where 
[A j B] := [B, AB ,..., -4+lB] 
is the well-known controllability matrix. So long as 7 : = T/N is positive, condi- 
tion (3. I) is compatible with the Gramian positivity conditions of (2.4). However, 
when 7-0, (2.4) fails to hold, even though (3.1), which is independent of 7, 
is unaffected. In the limit (PN) converges to (P,) and the evader knows at each t 
the values of ~(7) for all 7 E [0, t). This implies, in particular, that the evader 
also knows x(t) and can therefore choose w(t) according to a feedback law. 
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Suppose that the evader chooses e)(t) = Fx(t) for some appropriate matrix F, 
and assume further that he can find F such that 
W(CA + 4.F I BeI) ct W(CA +BP I &I). (3.2) 
Then, comparing (3.2) with (3.1) we see that the pursuer can no longer force 
capture for any x,, # 0. Hence, if (3.2) can be satisfied by some F then the 
limiting game (Pm) has no solution. It was shown in [I] that there always exists 
an F such that (3.2) is satisfied unless the condition holds that 
W(BJ C .W%). (3.3) 
When (3.3) holds, there exists a matrix G such that 
B, = B,G (3.4) 
and if for every evader control o(t) the pursuer employs the control 
where t(t) is yet to be specified, the closed-loop dynamics become 
k=Ax+B& (3.6) 
Hence the pursuer can undo the evader’s action instantaneously and the max- 
min controllability condition collapses to 
xo E W([A I %I) 
which is simply a pursuer-controllability statement. In this case the employment 
of a feedback law obviously does not enable the evader to prevent capture. 
Condition (3.3) is of course precisely equivalent to that under which Hajek’s 
snap decision rule can be employed in solving the max-min game (Pm). 
We conclude the paper with a brief examination of the solution of the problem 
(P,) under the assumption that the necessary condition (3.3) holds. For conve- 
nience we shall again assume that (2.4) holds for every finite 7 > 0. 
Denote by m9 and me , respectively, the pursuer and evader controllability 
Gramians evaluated on [0, T] (i.e., 7 = Tin (2.2) and (2.3)). Note that in view 
of (3.3) the evader’s effect on the dynamics is cancelled by the pursuer’s use of a 
control as in (3.5). Hence capture is assured, but there still remains the question 
of the optimal pay-off P,(u*, w*). In view of the fact that PN(u*, o*) is a non- 
decreasing function of N (the evader potentially gaining from the increased 
information) it follows that 
p&J*, w*> > p&d*, w*) = ‘$(rv@ - EQ-l x0 , (3.7) 
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where N is an arbitrary positive integer. The inequality (3.7) provides a lower 
bound for P,(u*, w*). On the other hand, suppose the pursuer commits himself 
to respond to any evader strategy by a control according to (3.9, then such a 
response may not be optimal for the pursuer in terms of pay-off, and since he is 
the minimizer it follows that 
p&J*, v*) < rntx rnp 10r [(e(t) - Gv(t))’ (t(t) - Gv(t)) - z(t)’ o(t)] dt. 
(3.8) 
The right-hand side of (3.8) is evaluated as follows: 
“,“” ?in JOT {( 5 - Gv)’ (8 - Gv) - V’V} dt 
(3.9) 
T 
= max Z’ Is 0 
v’(G’G - I) v dt + m;ln I’ (5’4 - 25’Gv) dt\ , 
0 
where the minimization 
m;ln IoT (E’[ - 2.5’Gzj) dt 
is subject to the constraint 
9 = Ax + B,(; x(0) = x0 ) x(T) = 0. 
Note that in the minimization problem w(t) is a specified function and therefore 
we can write 
eoT ((‘5 - 2t’Gzl) dt = j-’ r o (t - Gv)’ (6 - Gv) dt - r’ v’G’Gv dt. ‘0 
We can thus replace our minimization problem by 
subject to 
I 
T 
min u’u dt - v’G’Gv dt u 0 I 
i = Ax + B,( 
=Ax+B,u+B,Gv 
= Ax + B,u + Bp; x(0)=x,, x(T)=O, 
444 HEYMANN AND PACHTER 
where a(t) is a specified function on [O, T]. Upon resubstitution of the above 
expression in (3.9) we see that the right-hand side of (3.8) becomes 
rnfx m;ln lr (u’u - D’V) dt 
subject to the constraint 
2 = Ax + B,u + B,v; x(0) =x0, x(T) =o. 
The latter problem is of course precisely (PI), the solution to which is given by 
Pl(U”, v*) = x;(w, - ire),)-’ x, . 
Hence we obtain from (3.8) the upper bound for P,(u*, v*) 
P&*, v*> < X#vD - we)-’ xg 
and upon comparing (3.10) with (3.7) we finally conclude 
P&*9 v*) = X#=v~ - r,)-’ x0 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
as claimed. This concludes our analysis. 
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